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Factors Affecting Hedging Decisions
Using Evidence from the Cotton Industry
Practitioner’s Abstract
Few farmers utilize futures and options markets to price their crops despite significant
educational efforts.  This study seeks to analyze producer hedging behavior within the
framework of the overall marketing behavior.  Producer marketing behavior is modeled as a
simultaneous choice between cash sales, cooperative marketing and forward contracts, and
hedging.  A multinomial logit model is used for empirical estimation using data from a survey
administered to a sample of cotton producers from across the U.S.  The most important factors
that explain the use of forward pricing by cotton producers are producer preferences, farm
size, use of crop insurance, risk aversion, income from government payments and off-farm
income.  Risk aversion, off-farm income, crop insurance and some producer perceptions are
important in the choice of the form of forward pricing (direct hedging vs. cooperative
marketing and forward contracts).
Keywords
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Introduction
U.S. farm commodity programs shifted course with the passage of the 1996 Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act.  The FAIR Act decreased much of the
government’s price support and exposed producers to a potentially greater degree of price risk
than previously experienced.  In the new risk management environment, Congress perceived a
need to educate producers about various risk management tools.  In 1998, the Risk
Management Agency (RMA) funded over $3 million in educational grants to assist farmers and
ranchers in becoming active risk managers (Ag. Fact Book, 1998).  Despite significant efforts
to educate farmers about risk management tools, few producers use these tools.  Some recent
surveys (Asplund, Forster, and Stout, 1989; and Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994) demonstrated
that less than 10 percent of producers use hedging to manage their price risk (Table 1).
Previous studies outlined a number of factors that affect producers’ hedging decisions.
However, one limitation of the previous studies is that hedging was typically viewed in relative
isolation and no account was taken of other marketing alternatives available to producers.  That
is, previous hedging studies typically viewed marketing as a dichotomy between cash sales and
hedging with no consideration of alternative marketing methods.  However, important
countervailing forces may exist that affect the choice of a particular marketing strategy.  That
is, it may be argued that the choice of marketing strategy is not limited to the choice between2
cash sales and forward pricing, but also includes the choice of the form in which forward
pricing may take place.  Producers may have significant motivations to use forward pricing.
However, hedging with futures and options is not the only method of forward pricing.  Other
forms of forward pricing include forward contracting and marketing through pools.
Substitution between alternative means of forward pricing may result in the lower use of
hedging. Thus, it appears that the inclusion of the alternative marketing strategies may provide
additional insight on producer hedging behavior.
The overall objective of this study is 1) to examine producer hedging behavior in the
framework of their overall marketing behavior, 2) to determine the motivating factors in the
choice of a primary marketing strategy by cotton producers, and 3) to identify the
characteristics of cotton producers that are more likely to use direct hedging to forward price
their crop.  Marketing alternatives considered in this study include cash sales, indirect hedging
and direct hedging.  Cash sales consist of the transactions made in the cash market.  Indirect
hedging combines marketing through pools (cooperative marketing) and forward contracting.
And direct hedging includes taking positions in the futures and/or options markets.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section contains the
conceptual framework, which includes the discussion of various marketing alternatives
available to farmers, and factors that affect their marketing behavior.  The research method
used to analyze producer marketing behavior is addressed in the following section.  Discussion
of the data includes empirical evidence on the use of various marketing strategies based on the
results of the producer survey conducted throughout cotton producing states.  Finally, this
paper presents the results of the analysis and concludes with possible implications and
suggestions for future research.
Conceptual Framework
This study examines producer marketing behavior as producer’s choice of a preferred
marketing alternative, which is based on a set of producer characteristics:
Choice = f (Education, Training, RiskAversion, Leverage,                 (1)
      Size, GovPayments, OffIncome, CrInsurance,
      Attitude1, Attitude2, Attitude3)
The dependent variable in this choice model reflects several marketing alternatives considered
in this analysis: cash sales, cooperative marketing and forward pricing, and direct hedging.
Selling a crop in the cash market is the most basic marketing tool available to farmers.  This
strategy is easy to use for producers and has significant liquidity advantages because the
producer receives cash for his crop at the time of sale.  However, marketing on a cash basis is
often considered a risky alternative because a producer does not have any control over the
market price and is fully exposed to market price changes that occur between the time of
planting and sale. Alternatively, producers may use some form of forward pricing in order to3
reduce their price risk exposure.  Forms of forward pricing included in this analysis consist of
forward contracting and marketing through pools (cooperatives) and hedging in the futures and
options markets. Historically, these have been the most widely used forward pricing strategies;
therefore, they should be representative of the marketing alternatives available to cotton
producers.
 Explanatory variables hypothesized to influence the choice of a primary marketing
strategy may be summarized in three categories: (1) characteristics of the farm operator and
the farm: operator’s human capital, farm size and financial condition; (2) operator use of
alternative risk-reduction techniques: diversification of farm enterprises, participation in
government commodity programs, and the use of crop insurance; and (3) non-economic
factors. The first set of determinants was advanced by the proponents of the technology
adoption literature (Wozniak, 1984; Huffman, 1980; and Khaldi, 1975).  Adoption theory is
relevant for producer marketing decisions because the producer is faced with a choice of
whether to use a conventional method of selling the crop in the cash market, or to adopt one of
the alternative forward pricing techniques.  Education and marketing-specific training are used
as a proxy for human capital and innovative ability/willingness to adopt alternative marketing
methods.  Education and hours of marketing training are expected to be directly related to the
use of forward pricing strategies because higher levels of human capital are likely to facilitate
successful use of these instruments.
Level of risk aversion was included to measure the potential effects of different levels
of risk preference.  The impact of risk aversion on the choice of marketing strategy depends on
the producer’s perception about the risk reducing qualities of this strategy.  If forward pricing
is expected to reduce risk, this variable will have a positive effect on the use of forward pricing
techniques.  Similarly, if cash marketing is expected to increase risk, this variable will have a
negative impact on the choice of cash sales.
Economies of size are often associated with forward pricing (Tronstad, 1991; Goodwin
and Schroeder, 1994; Asplund, Forster, and Stout, 1989).  Previous research suggests that
learning about alternative marketing strategies have significant lumpy costs.  Because larger
farms can spread these lumpy costs over more production and enjoy a potentially larger net
price enhancement per unit of production, they are more likely to use these alternative
marketing strategies. Similar arguments can be made regarding the use of futures and options
contracts because such strategies may involve using particular equipment necessary to obtain
market information, subscriptions to market information and market advisory services, and
transactions costs associated with trading activities.   Additionally, some large farms often
employ hired labor, which means that managers may have more time to devote to the
marketing function and combine both production and marketing duties (this factor is
particularly important for some labor intensive commodities, such as cotton).  This variable is
expected to have a positive effect on the use of forward pricing, consistent with the economies
of size hypothesis.4
Financial characteristics of the farm have also been shown to play a role in the use of
forward pricing techniques.  One of the most important components of the financial
characteristics of the farm is leverage (Brorsen, 1995; Turvey and Baker, 1989; Collins,
1997). This study uses long-term debt-to-asset ratio as a proxy for leverage.  It is hypothesized
that this is a more general measure of leverage because it excludes the short-term component
that varies from year to year depending on the capital needs for operating expenses.  Optimal
hedge models suggest a positive impact of leverage on the use of forward pricing because
forward pricing may provide an additional source of liquidity.  However, Asplund, Forster,
and Stout (1989) argue that leverage and forward pricing may be negatively correlated if a
farm operator’s use of debt and leverage indicates his lack of risk aversion.  This relationship
may indicate producer’s lack of desire to reduce risk through forward pricing.  This argument
creates some ambiguity on the expected sign of leverage.
A second set of variables is included to reflect the interaction of marketing methods
with other factors that affect income risk.  Forward pricing is not the only method of risk
reduction.  Alternative methods considered in this analysis include obtaining income from off
farm sources, participating in government commodity programs, and purchasing crop
insurance.   If off-farm income is considered within the risk-balancing framework (Turvey,
1989; Gabriel and Baker, 1980), it is expected to substitute for hedging.  This proposition
suggests an inverse relationship between off-farm income and hedging.  However, as Asplund,
Forster, and Stout (1989) point out, off-farm work activities by farm family members may be
complementary to hedging if they are used as a response to income/price variability.  In this
case, the use of forward pricing and off-farm income may be positively correlated because both
would be used as strategies to reduce risk.
Participation in government commodity programs is another alternative way to reduce
risk exposure.  The majority of the previous literature (Turvey and Baker, 1990; Sakong,
Hayes, and Hallam, 1993; Hanson, Myers, and Hilker, 1999) suggest an inverse relationship
between government programs and forward pricing because government programs, in essence,
provide a free put option for a producer. Other studies (Featherstone et al., 1988; Collins,
1985; Gabriel and Baker, 1980) have analyzed the impact of government programs from the
risk-balancing standpoint.  These authors argued that risk reducing and income augmenting
policies may induce choices that increase financial risk (i.e., higher leverage).  If leverage is
directly related to hedging (as suggested by Turvey and Baker, 1990; Collins, 1997; and
Brorsen, 1995), these findings suggest an indirect positive effect of government payments on
forward pricing.  Thus, the total impact of government payments consists of a negative direct
impact and a positive indirect impact.  Because the magnitude of these effects is not known,
the direction of the total impact is ambiguous.
Another alternative to minimize risk is crop insurance.  The effects of the crop
insurance on forward pricing decisions have not been studied extensively.  Coble, Heifner and
Zuniga (2000) observed that yield insurance products exhibit complementary relationship with
hedging, while revenue insurance products act as substitutes to hedging at some levels of5
coverage.  Therefore, the direction of the impact of this variable is ambiguous because it
depends on the type of the insurance purchased and the level of coverage.
The third set of variables included in this analysis is non-economic variables.  The
limited significance of some previous empirical studies of hedging has led some authors
(Musser, Patrick and Eckman, 1996) to suggest that there may be a large random component
associated with forward pricing or some alternative non-economic explanation. Shapiro and
Brorsen (1988) found that the most important factor related to hedging in their study was
farmers perception of whether hedging can increase income stability.  Furthermore, Pennings
and Leuthold (2000) found that farmers’ behavioral attitudes related to market orientation, risk
exposure, market performance, and entrepreneurial behavior played an important role in their
use of futures contracts.  Therefore, several variables measuring producer perceptions of
various marketing strategies were included in this analysis.
One of the non-economic variables included in this study reflected producer assessment
of their personal marketing skills.  It is hypothesized that producers with perceived high level
of marketing abilities would be more comfortable using futures and options.  A variable
reflecting producer’s personal preferences for various marketing channels was also included in
this analysis.  Finally, a variable intended to measure producer perceptions of market
efficiency was included.  If producers believe that markets are efficient, there should be no
consistent premiums to market timing strategies.  Otherwise, premiums would exist and act as
an additional motivation to using forward pricing.  These variables were introduced in the form
of responses to Likert-scale questions.  These responses were coded such that the strongest
agreement received a highest value and strongest disagreement received a lowest value.
Empirical Model and Estimation Procedure
Because the choice of a primary marketing strategy is mostly discrete (as most farmers
use a single marketing channel), a multinomial logit model was used for estimation. The
estimated model had a following functional form:
Prob (Choice = j) = b0 + b1*Education + b2 *Training + (2)
b3*RiskAversion + b4*Leverage + b5 * Size +
b6 *GovPayments +b7 *OffIncome +b8 *CrInsurance +
b9 *Attitude1 + b10 *Attitude2+ b11 *Attitude3 + e
Where the choice parameter j is 0 if the majority of the crop was sold in the cash market, is1 if
most of the crop was marketed through a pool or a forward contract, and equal 2 if most of the
crop was priced through futures and/or options markets.
Marketing through pools and forward contracting is combined in this analysis because
these two strategies contain the features of indirect hedging.  That is, when producers sell their6
crop through pools or forward contracts, they do not directly take a position in the
futures/options markets.  Rather, the other party that entered into this contractual agreement
with producer likely hedges this purchase and the producer thereby receives the benefits of the
hedge indirectly.  According to pool regulations and many forward contracts, a producer under
these arrangements is guaranteed a minimum price without forfeiting the opportunity to obtain
a higher price, if it becomes available. Another reason for combining marketing through pools
and forward contracting is the statistical qualities of the model to be estimated.  Within a
multinomial logit model, the number of parameters proliferates with the number of choices
(Greene, 1997).  Therefore, similar strategies were combined to conserve degrees of freedom.
Taking a position in the futures and/or options markets is combined under a direct
hedging option because these tools, although different, have many similar characteristics.  It is
important to note that the direct hedging option included all positions taken by producers in the
futures and options markets, which include both hedging and speculation.  No distinction
between hedging and speculation was made in this study.  Independent variables included in
the empirical model are defined in Table 2.
The empirical model is estimated using a multinomial logit technique. The multinomial
logit model is a general extension of a binomial logit model because it permits estimation of
qualitative choice when more than two alternatives are involved.   A general form of a
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estimates are used to determine the probability of choice j, given xi.  Equation 3 is estimated
using the maximum likelihood procedures, which yield consistent and efficient parameter
estimators (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991).
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Where Pij is the probability that the ith cotton producer will choose a jth marketing strategy, ln
Pij/Pik  is the natural log of the probability of choice j relative to the probability of choice k, a
is the intercept, x is a matix of producer i’s characteristics, b is a matrix of parameters that
reflect the impact of changes in x on the probability of choosing jth or kth marketing strategy,
and Ei is the normally distributed error term with its mean equal to zero.  However, coefficient
estimates of this model are difficult to interpret. Greene points out that there is at least some
potential for confusion, because for any particular xk,  k j x P ¶ ¶ /  need not have the same sign as
bjk, as can be seen from equation (3).7
The marginal effects of the attributes on probabilities of choice are determined by
differentiating equation 3:
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Therefore, every subvector of b enters every marginal effect, both through the probabilities
and through the weighted average that appears in dj.  These marginal effects are computed
from the parameter estimates and used in the discussion of model results.
Data
The data for this study is obtained from a mail survey, which was administered during
the spring and early summer of 2000 throughout the cotton growing states of the U.S.  The
questionnaire elicited cross sectional data for 1999 crop year.  Respondents of the survey
represented a random sample of cotton producers in the respective states.  The survey
generated about seven percent response rate, which resulted in 108 usable observations.  The
survey data were tested for a possible presence of the non-response bias using the “wave”
technique (Ratneshwar and Stewart, 1989).  Although no statistical evidence of the non-
response bias in the sample was detected, the small sample size is a source of concern.
According to the survey data, in 1999, farm operations had an average of 1,459 acres
of land, which included cotton as well as other enterprises.  Producers owned about 38 percent
of this farmland.  These farm operations had an average market value of farm assets of
$837,000, with about 40 percent in the 100,000 to 599,999 category.  These were relatively
large farms compared to national averages across all farms of 487 acres of land per farm and
$507,426 of market value of assets (1997 Census of Agriculture).  The average age of the
participants of the survey was 50.5 years.  This is similar to the participants of Asplund,
Forster, and Stout’s (1989) survey (51 years) and to the national average of 54.3 years
reported by 1997 Census of Agriculture.  Summary statistics of the independent variables used
in empirical estimation are presented in Table 2.
The survey reveals that about 22 percent of producers sold most of their crop in the
cash market, about 62 percent used indirect hedging strategies and about 16 percent of cotton
producers used futures and options markets to price most of their crop in 1999 (Figure1).  The
survey also demonstrates that about 65 percent of cotton producers marketed their cotton
through a single marketing channel.  The other 35 percent of producers utilized some
combination of several marketing strategies, typically marketing the majority of their crop
through one primary source.  Therefore, the discrete choice modeling approach taken in this
study to analyze marketing behavior of cotton producers appears justified.8
Estimation Results
Overall, the estimated model is highly significant in explaining producers’ selection of
preferred marketing strategies with a Chi-squared value of 75, which is statistically significant
at the 0.01 level.  Another measure of the goodness of fit is the model’s likelihood ratio index,
which was equal to 0.62.  This measure is somewhat analogous to the R-squared in the
conventional regression models (Greene, 1997).  Another indication of the goodness of fit is
the model’s predictive power. The predictive power of the model is examined by comparing
the actual choices of the primary marketing strategies to the ones predicted by the model.  The
model correctly predicted about 78 percent of marketing choices for the sample of producers
used in this analysis.  The model correctly predicted about 63 percent of the cash sales, 88
percent of indirect hedging, and about 59 percent of direct hedging observations as a primary
marketing tool. Thus, the predictive power of the model appears satisfactory.
The results of model estimation are presented in Table 3.  Estimated coefficients of the
multinomial logit model reflect the effect of changes in independent variables on the log of the
ratios of the probabilities (equation 4).  Thus, coefficients presented in Table 3 reflect the
effect of changes in independent variables on the probability of selecting indirect hedging
(pools or forward contracts) or direct hedging (with futures and/or options) relative to a base
scenario of selling cotton in the cash market (choice k in equation 4).
The results indicate that the probability of selecting indirect hedging over cash selling is
directly related to farm size and agreement with Attitude1 (“A marketing pool nets me a higher
price than I can get myself”) and Attitude2 (“I prefer to use other means of risk management
rather than hedging”), and inversely related to income from government payments and off-
farm income.  The probability of selecting direct hedging over cash sales is directly related to
risk aversion, farm size, and purchases of additional levels of crop insurance, and inversely
related to income from government payments and agreement with Attitude2.
Because estimated coefficients of the multinomial logit model are somewhat difficult to
interpret, another set of results is presented in the form of marginal effects evaluated at the
means of independent variables (Table 4).  Marginal effects denote the effect of a change in the
independent variable on the probability of choice in dependent variable (equation 5).  The
marginal effects demonstrate that, at the means of all independent variables, the probability of
choosing cash sales is 14 percent, the probability of choosing indirect hedging is 78 percent,
and the probability of choosing direct hedging as a primary marketing tool is 8 percent. Thus,
the model overestimated the probability of choosing indirect hedging, and underestimated the
probability of choosing cash sales and direct hedging as primary marketing tools.
Table 4 illustrates that the probability of choosing cash sales as a primary marketing
strategy is directly related to off-farm income, and income from government payments, and
inversely related to agreement with Attitude1 and farm size.  Risk aversion, crop insurance,
and agreement with Attitude1 are marginally significant (at 20 percent level) and inversely9
related to the probability of choosing cash sales.  The probability of choosing indirect hedging
as a primary marketing strategy is positively affected by agreement with Attitude1 and
Attitude2, and negatively affected by off-farm income and income from government payments.
The choice of direct hedging is negatively correlated with agreement with Attitude1 and
Attitude2.  Farm size and crop insurance are marginally significant (at 20 percent level) and
have a positive effect on the probability of choosing direct hedging.
The statistical significance of the marginal effects of some variables discussed above
was fairly low because of the small sample size.  However, the relationships revealed by these
marginal effects are consistent with those identified by parameter estimates.  Also, these
relationships are consistent with theory and support the hypotheses proposed in the conceptual
framework.  Therefore marginally significant variables are included in the discussion.
Agreement with Attitude1 is significant in the choice of all selected marketing
strategies. This question is designed to measure producer perceptions of their marketing
abilities relative to the pools.  Only 16 percent of producers rate their marketing abilities
higher than that of the pools.  Consequently, this variable indicates that because producers do
not think highly of their personal marketing abilities, they prefer to purchase marketing
services from pools.  These results also suggest that the belief that marketing pools obtain
higher prices for their members makes them more attractive than alternative marketing
strategies. These price premiums may be associated with better marketing practices as well as
other advantages of marketing through a pool, which may include quantity and quality
premiums resulting from marketing larger lots and/or better combinations of quality as well as
savings on transaction costs, including manager’s time and money allocated on collecting
market information, and additional liquidity available at harvest time when crop is relinquished
to a pool.
Agreement with Attitude2 (“I prefer to use other means of risk management rather than
hedging”) is also significant in the choice of all selected marketing strategies.  This variable
indicates the effect of producer preferences on his/her marketing decisions.    The marginal
effects of this variable indicate that a one unit increase in the level of agreement with Attitude2
results in a six percent decrease in the probability of choosing cash sales, an 11 percent
decrease in the probability of choosing direct hedging, and an 18 percent increase in the
probability of choosing indirect hedging as a primary marketing tool.  This evidence suggests
that the preferred marketing choice of cotton producers is indirect hedging (this category is
primarily composed of pool sales, but forward contracting is also an important marketing
method).
Percent off-farm income is significant in the choice of cash sales and indirect hedging
as primary marketing tools.  It appears that producers that have a large share of their total
income coming from off-farm sources may be less inclined to use indirect hedging and more
likely to choose cash sales as their primary marketing tool.  This result is consistent with
Shapiro and Brorsen’s (1988) findings. This evidence suggests that drawing income from10
diversified sources substitutes for the use of forward pricing methods, indirect hedging in
particular.  This result also provides evidence for the risk-reducing characteristics of off-farm
income.
According to the marginal effects, income from government payments is directly
related to the probability of choosing cash sales and inversely related to the probability of
choosing indirect hedging as a primary marketing tool.  Parameter estimates also suggest that
income from government payments had a negative impact on the probability of choice of direct
hedging as a primary marketing strategy.  These results confirm the hypothesis about risk-
reducing properties of government payments, and suggest that because producers’ income is
protected in part by government payments, they are less inclined to use forward pricing
strategies and more likely to choose cash sales as their primary marketing tool.
Cotton acreage, included as a measure of farm size, is negatively related to the
probability of choosing cash sales and positively related to the probability of choosing direct
hedging as a primary marketing method.  This evidence supports the economies of size
hypothesis, which is consistent with the previous studies (Goodwin and Schroeder, 1994;
Asplund, Forster, and Stout, 1989; and Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988).
Producers that purchased additional crop insurance above the minimal level required to
remain eligible for government payments are 11 percent more likely to choose cash sales and 9
percent more likely to choose direct hedging as their primary marketing tool.  This finding
indicates a complimentary relationship between crop insurance and the use of direct hedging.
About 80 percent of the sample of producers in this analysis purchased MPCI, which is a yield
insurance product.  Thus, this result is consistent with Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga’s (2000)
findings, that indicate a complimentary relationship between yield insurance products and
direct hedging. This result may also imply that producers who purchase crop insurance are
generally more risk averse, therefore they are more likely to use forward pricing techniques
such as hedging.
Coefficients suggest that risk aversion is positively associated with the probability of
choosing direct hedging as a primary marketing strategy.  According to marginal effects, risk
aversion is also marginally significant in influencing the probability of choosing cash sales as a
primary marketing strategy. The signs of the estimated coefficients suggest that risk aversion
leads producers away from cash sales to alternative marketing strategies, direct hedging in
particular. These findings are consistent with expectations and imply that producers consider
cash sales a relatively risky method of marketing.  They also confirm the view that forward
pricing (direct hedging in particular) is used as a risk reducing marketing method.
This analysis found no evidence that level of producer education, marketing specific
training, long-term debt, and agreement with Attitude3 (“I believe that market timing strategies
can increase revenues”) have significant impact on hedging behavior.  The lack of significance
of marketing specific training is consistent with Shapiro and Brorsen’s (1988) findings.  This11
evidence implies that additional marketing specific training is not effective in altering
producer marketing practices.
Levels of formal education and leverage are also insignificant in determining the choice
of a primary marketing strategy by cotton farmers.  This result contradicts previous studies by
Shapiro and Brorsen (1988), Goodwin and Schroeder (1994), and Asplund, Forster, and Stout
(1989).  This result may be caused by the measurement limitations of the variables used in this
study.  Another variable that is not statistically significant in the estimated model is the
agreement with Attitude3 (“I believe that market timing strategies can increase revenues”).
Considering that 78 percent of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, this
finding suggests that price premiums expected from market timing strategies are not strong
motivators of producer marketing behavior.  This outcome could have resulted from the fact
that few producers believe in their individual marketing abilities (only 16 percent of producers
disagreed with Attitude1 “A marketing pool nets me a higher price than I can get myself”).
Summary and Conclusions
This study is designed to analyze producer hedging decisions in the context of their
overall marketing behavior.  This approach involves examination of producer marketing
behavior as a choice between alternative marketing strategies (cash sales, indirect hedging, and
direct hedging). This study extends the previous models of hedging behavior by overcoming
the dichotomy of forward pricing versus cash sales.  This analysis disaggregates forward
pricing decisions into direct (futures and options) and indirect (pools and forward contracts)
hedging and examines all three marketing alternatives simultaneously.  The results of the
multinomial logit model estimation suggest that, at the means of independent variables, the
probability of choice of cash sales is 14 percent, the probability of choosing indirect hedging is
78 percent, and the probability of choosing direct hedging as a primary marketing tool is 8
percent.  These results appear to perform well in explaing the empirical evidence reported in
the previous studies (Table 1) and the results of the survey reported in this study (Figure 1).
The findings of this study highlight the importance of indirect hedging for cotton marketing,
marketing through pools in particular.  About 50 percent of cotton producers marketed their
cotton through pools.  Such a high share of marketing through pools is not typical for other
commodities and may reflect some unique aspects of cotton marketing including economic and
non-economic factors.
Disaggregation of forward pricing into direct and indirect hedging alternatives
permitted determination of the specific impacts of motivating factors on the choice of particular
marketing alternatives. For example, purchases of additional levels of crop insurance and risk
aversion were significant for direct hedging decisions but not for indirect hedging decisions.
Similarly, off-farm income had a significant influence on the indirect hedging decisions, but
not on direct hedging decisions.12
The results of a multinomial logit model identified a number of factors that affect the
probability of choosing one of the selected marketing strategies by cotton producers.  The most
important factors that explain the use of forward pricing by cotton producers are producer
preferences, farm size, crop insurance, risk aversion, income from government payments and
off-farm income. To the extent that the sample is representative, this study provides some
interesting implications.  For example, producer preferences were one of the most important
factors affecting hedging behavior (consistent with Shapiro and Brorsen, 1988), while some
economic variables were not statistically significant.
This study also identified certain producer characteristics, which increase the
probability of choice of certain marketing strategies.  For example, owners of large farms,
producers that are more risk averse, individuals that purchased additional levels of crop
insurance, farmers that receive a fairly small share of their income in the form of government
payments and those who did not indicate any personal preference of other forms of risk
management and don’t believe in price premiums associated with marketing through pools will
be more likely to use direct hedging as their primary strategy.  These results can be used by
educators to better tailor their training programs to the specific needs of the audiences they
address.  Targeting learning about other forms of marketing such as pools and forward
contracts, in addition to futures/options, also appears warranted given the conditions and
preferences expressed by producers.
Another set of results may be of interest to policy makers.  This study reveals a
negative impact of income from government programs on the use of forward pricing
techniques. This finding suggests that as long as government payments remain in place,
producer use of forward pricing is likely to remain low. Since the passage of the 1996 FAIR
Act, Congress discussed the need to assist farmers and ranchers in becoming active risk
managers.  Numerous grants have been funded to support educational programs focusing on
various risk management tools including crop insurance and futures and options.  However,
efforts to support producer’s income and encourage use of futures and options appear
contradictory based on the evidence presented in this study as well as prior theoretical models.
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Cash Sales Indirect Hedging Direct Hedging16
Table 1.  Empirical Futures Use.
Authors Location Year Commodity Fut. Use
(% of
producers)
Asplund, Forster and Stout Ohio 1987 Crop 7.00












Table 2.  Summary Statistics for Variables Used in the Empirical Estimation.
Variable Definition Mean Standard
Deviation
Education 1=less than high school, 2=high school
diploma or GED, 3=college, and 4=
graduate school
2.71 0.70
Training Hours of training attended 4.73 9.73
RiskAversion Self-assessment of the willingness to take
risks relative to others on a scale from 1
to 10 with 10 being the most risky
5.72 1.96
Leverage The proportion of the market value of the
farm assets that was borrowed in 1999
0.18 0.20
Size Cotton acres (thousands) 0.74 0.68




OffIncome Off-farm income/gross farm income 0.20 0.25
CrInsurance 1 if producer bought additional levels of
crop insurance above CAT coverage, 0
otherwise
0.64 0.48
Attitude1 A marketing pool nets me a higher price
than I can get myself
b
3.48 1.08
Attitude2 I prefer to use other means of risk
management rather than hedging
b
3.59 0.91




a Includes disaster payments, loan deficiency payments, producer option payments, and AMTA
(transfer) payments.
b Likert-scale questions from 1 to 5 with 5 indicating the highest level of agreement.18
Table 3.  Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Probability of Using Indirect Hedging and
Direct Hedging Relative to the Base Scenario of Selling Cotton in the Cash Market.
a


















































Likelihood  ratio index
74.824***
0.62
aNumbers in parentheses are asymptotical standard errors.  The *, **, and *** indicate coefficients
asymptotically significant at 15, 10, and 5 percent levels, respectively.19
















































































P of choice at
mean 0.141 0.779 0.080
Actual Choice 24 67 17
Correctly
Predicted 15 59 10
aNumbers in parentheses are asymptotical standard errors.  The *, **, and *** indicate coefficients
asymptotically significant at 15, 10, and 5 percent levels, respectively.